[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
views is closest to your own? Russia s joining NATO is &
work in the body politic of post-postcommunist Russia. Most Russians still want
cooperative ties, while most of those same Russians find NATO more of a menace
than they did in the past. These contradictions, and the quandary for Western policy-
makers, are bound to worsen if NATO pushes ahead with plans for extending its
2004 boundaries further to the east. Mikhail Saakashvili s Georgia has pushed
hardest for an invitation, and Russia undoubtedly will fight such a shift until the
end. But Georgia will be small potatoes compared to the massive campaign Russia
is certain to wage to keep a second country on the potential candidates list, one far
larger and far dearer to Russian hearts Ukraine from transferring its allegiance
completely to the Western Alliance, as its president, Viktor Yushchenko, intends
it to do. Polls show Russians to be extremely sensitive to even token gestures of
military collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, such as the joint exercises
scheduled for Crimea, but canceled, in 2006. NATO Ukraine cooperation, to say
nothing of NATO membership for Ukraine, is more repugnant to Russian citizens
than NATO cooperation with Russia.6
This is not to argue for perpetuation of the status quo. I merely caution that
unreflecting attempts to change the status quo, especially if they continue in
the mold of the mechanical enlargement strategy of the 1990s, will create huge
problems in our relationship with Russia. As for Russia, even without foreign-
policy headaches it faces numerous domestic conundrums in the years ahead.
Vladimir Putin s constitutional second term as president of the federation expired
in the spring of 2008. He succeeded in handing the baton to a designated heir,
Post-postcommunist Russia 37
Dmitrii Medvedev, but for the time being will hold the important office of prime
minister in the new government. For that and other reasons, Medvedev will at the
outset rule with far less authority than his patron had. He will have his hands full
with domestic problems, such as diversifying an economy more dependent than
ever on exports of fuels and metals, sustaining growth, and managing a difficult
security situation in the North Caucasus. The Kremlin ideologists are determined to
handle this agenda while maintaining Russia as what has been called, since 2004,
sovereign democracy (suverennaya demokratiya). The phrase boils down to a
commitment to prevent external players from shaping Russia s internal political
environment, as happened, spokesmen for the ruling group have insisted, in the
colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.
The external stimulus that most affected internal trends in post-communist
countries beyond the western borders of the former Soviet Union was the prospect
and then the reality of acceptance into the European Union not into NATO. For
Russia and, for all practical purposes, for Ukraine, EU admission is an impossibility
for the time being. The Russian elite lacks even the aspiration to enter the EU,
and thereby Europe, that drives many in the Ukrainian elite. This hurdle makes
NATO and its expanding eastern frontier much more of a bone of contention
between Russia and Western governments than if there was some other game
in town.
All of which drives me to the conclusion that the United States and the NATO
Alliance, having lived off of the intellectual capital of decades past, must now
commit to a searching exploration of frameworks for security in Europe. Mindless
extension of the policy line of the 1990s will not produce the easy gains it produced
then, will make neo-containment of Russia and rollback of its influence more and
more the focus of policy, and will intensify Russia s political isolation. It is time
to open dialogue and debate about a new structure for a new age. One way or
the other, that new structure has to make room for the modern, democratic, self-
confident, and restrained Russian state which does not yet exist but without which
neither Russia nor Europe will be whole.
Notes
1 This evocative phrase seems to have originated in descriptions of Turkish politics and to
have been put into international general circulation by Suleyman Demirel, president of
Turkey from 1994 to 1999.
2 In raw proportions, 45 percent of survey respondents under the age of 30 preferred a
military solution on Chechnya and 49 percent preferred a negotiated solution; over the
age of 69, 23 percent preferred a military solution and 64 percent preferred a negotiated
solution.
3 At http://www.cfr.org/publication/74/expanding_nato.html.
4 The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was not, of course, a NATO operation, but, besides
the United States and Britain, the big military players, a number of NATO members sent
smaller contingents.
38 T.J. Colton
5 For example, Oslon s researchers asked survey respondents in May 2002, April 2004,
August 2005, and June 2006 whether they considered that NATO poses a threat to
Russia s security. Fifty-one percent in 2004 and 50 percent in 2006 said it did; 26 percent
in 2004 and 25 percent in 2006 said it did; and 23 percent in 2004 and 25 percent in
2006 had no answer to the question. See the report at http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/
frontier/NATO/etb062310.
6 A Public Opinion Foundation poll in June 2006 found that 60 percent of Russians
disapproved of joint exercises between Ukraine and NATO, 3 percent approved, and 25
percent were indifferent. Compare this to a survey by the same organization in August
2005 in which only 20 percent disapproved of recently concluded NATO-Russian war
games, with 38 percent approving and 42 percent being unable to say. At http://bd.english.
fom.ru/report/map/ed062312; and http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/etb053510.
3 Russia, NATO enlargement and
the strengthening of democracy
in the European space
S. Neil MacFarlane
Introduction
NATO enlargement is considered by many to be one dimension of a project to
create not only a single security space, but also a single normative space a space
characterized by democratic values, respect for human rights, open economies,
and durable peace. NATO is just one of a number of international institutions
pursuing this shared objective, the others including the Council of Europe (CoE),
the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE).
On the face of it, one might expect that both NATO enlargement and the pro-
motion of democratic transformation might generate problems in the relationship
with Russia. From a realist or geopolitical perspective, the expansion of the North
Atlantic Alliance weakens Russia s position in Europe. The same might be true
of democracy promotion. Russia s government and, apparently, most Russians,
show little interest in the development of liberal democratic institutions and
practice. Putin s regime displays much greater interest in control and consolida-
tion than in democratization. Where the latter gets in the way of the former, it is
sidelined.
There are many dimensions to this pattern. The past six years have witnessed
a steady effort on the part of the government to narrow the space for freedom of
expression in the media. The numbers of independent outlets for news and analysis
have shrunk. Those that remain have read the writing on the wall, and censor
themselves. As the case of Anna Politkovskaya suggests, being off message can be
hazardous. The Duma has effectively been neutralized by changes in percentages
rules limiting the representation of the most critical political forces on the liberal end
of the spectrum; the president has effective control of the less pluralistic legislature [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl freetocraft.keep.pl
views is closest to your own? Russia s joining NATO is &
work in the body politic of post-postcommunist Russia. Most Russians still want
cooperative ties, while most of those same Russians find NATO more of a menace
than they did in the past. These contradictions, and the quandary for Western policy-
makers, are bound to worsen if NATO pushes ahead with plans for extending its
2004 boundaries further to the east. Mikhail Saakashvili s Georgia has pushed
hardest for an invitation, and Russia undoubtedly will fight such a shift until the
end. But Georgia will be small potatoes compared to the massive campaign Russia
is certain to wage to keep a second country on the potential candidates list, one far
larger and far dearer to Russian hearts Ukraine from transferring its allegiance
completely to the Western Alliance, as its president, Viktor Yushchenko, intends
it to do. Polls show Russians to be extremely sensitive to even token gestures of
military collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, such as the joint exercises
scheduled for Crimea, but canceled, in 2006. NATO Ukraine cooperation, to say
nothing of NATO membership for Ukraine, is more repugnant to Russian citizens
than NATO cooperation with Russia.6
This is not to argue for perpetuation of the status quo. I merely caution that
unreflecting attempts to change the status quo, especially if they continue in
the mold of the mechanical enlargement strategy of the 1990s, will create huge
problems in our relationship with Russia. As for Russia, even without foreign-
policy headaches it faces numerous domestic conundrums in the years ahead.
Vladimir Putin s constitutional second term as president of the federation expired
in the spring of 2008. He succeeded in handing the baton to a designated heir,
Post-postcommunist Russia 37
Dmitrii Medvedev, but for the time being will hold the important office of prime
minister in the new government. For that and other reasons, Medvedev will at the
outset rule with far less authority than his patron had. He will have his hands full
with domestic problems, such as diversifying an economy more dependent than
ever on exports of fuels and metals, sustaining growth, and managing a difficult
security situation in the North Caucasus. The Kremlin ideologists are determined to
handle this agenda while maintaining Russia as what has been called, since 2004,
sovereign democracy (suverennaya demokratiya). The phrase boils down to a
commitment to prevent external players from shaping Russia s internal political
environment, as happened, spokesmen for the ruling group have insisted, in the
colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.
The external stimulus that most affected internal trends in post-communist
countries beyond the western borders of the former Soviet Union was the prospect
and then the reality of acceptance into the European Union not into NATO. For
Russia and, for all practical purposes, for Ukraine, EU admission is an impossibility
for the time being. The Russian elite lacks even the aspiration to enter the EU,
and thereby Europe, that drives many in the Ukrainian elite. This hurdle makes
NATO and its expanding eastern frontier much more of a bone of contention
between Russia and Western governments than if there was some other game
in town.
All of which drives me to the conclusion that the United States and the NATO
Alliance, having lived off of the intellectual capital of decades past, must now
commit to a searching exploration of frameworks for security in Europe. Mindless
extension of the policy line of the 1990s will not produce the easy gains it produced
then, will make neo-containment of Russia and rollback of its influence more and
more the focus of policy, and will intensify Russia s political isolation. It is time
to open dialogue and debate about a new structure for a new age. One way or
the other, that new structure has to make room for the modern, democratic, self-
confident, and restrained Russian state which does not yet exist but without which
neither Russia nor Europe will be whole.
Notes
1 This evocative phrase seems to have originated in descriptions of Turkish politics and to
have been put into international general circulation by Suleyman Demirel, president of
Turkey from 1994 to 1999.
2 In raw proportions, 45 percent of survey respondents under the age of 30 preferred a
military solution on Chechnya and 49 percent preferred a negotiated solution; over the
age of 69, 23 percent preferred a military solution and 64 percent preferred a negotiated
solution.
3 At http://www.cfr.org/publication/74/expanding_nato.html.
4 The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was not, of course, a NATO operation, but, besides
the United States and Britain, the big military players, a number of NATO members sent
smaller contingents.
38 T.J. Colton
5 For example, Oslon s researchers asked survey respondents in May 2002, April 2004,
August 2005, and June 2006 whether they considered that NATO poses a threat to
Russia s security. Fifty-one percent in 2004 and 50 percent in 2006 said it did; 26 percent
in 2004 and 25 percent in 2006 said it did; and 23 percent in 2004 and 25 percent in
2006 had no answer to the question. See the report at http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/
frontier/NATO/etb062310.
6 A Public Opinion Foundation poll in June 2006 found that 60 percent of Russians
disapproved of joint exercises between Ukraine and NATO, 3 percent approved, and 25
percent were indifferent. Compare this to a survey by the same organization in August
2005 in which only 20 percent disapproved of recently concluded NATO-Russian war
games, with 38 percent approving and 42 percent being unable to say. At http://bd.english.
fom.ru/report/map/ed062312; and http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/etb053510.
3 Russia, NATO enlargement and
the strengthening of democracy
in the European space
S. Neil MacFarlane
Introduction
NATO enlargement is considered by many to be one dimension of a project to
create not only a single security space, but also a single normative space a space
characterized by democratic values, respect for human rights, open economies,
and durable peace. NATO is just one of a number of international institutions
pursuing this shared objective, the others including the Council of Europe (CoE),
the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE).
On the face of it, one might expect that both NATO enlargement and the pro-
motion of democratic transformation might generate problems in the relationship
with Russia. From a realist or geopolitical perspective, the expansion of the North
Atlantic Alliance weakens Russia s position in Europe. The same might be true
of democracy promotion. Russia s government and, apparently, most Russians,
show little interest in the development of liberal democratic institutions and
practice. Putin s regime displays much greater interest in control and consolida-
tion than in democratization. Where the latter gets in the way of the former, it is
sidelined.
There are many dimensions to this pattern. The past six years have witnessed
a steady effort on the part of the government to narrow the space for freedom of
expression in the media. The numbers of independent outlets for news and analysis
have shrunk. Those that remain have read the writing on the wall, and censor
themselves. As the case of Anna Politkovskaya suggests, being off message can be
hazardous. The Duma has effectively been neutralized by changes in percentages
rules limiting the representation of the most critical political forces on the liberal end
of the spectrum; the president has effective control of the less pluralistic legislature [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]