[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
the subject of the negotiations, on January viet revisionism. In China anti-Soviet bro- interest these states all the more loudly urge
15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet chures and posters are being published in the PRC to get actively involved in the
another step - it made a proposal to the huge numbers and widely distributed. For international community.
leadership of the PRC to conclude an agree- example, not long ago a series of brochures Recently the Chinese leadership has
ment between the USSR and the PRC on the with clearly anti-Soviet content was recom- been rather pointedly making outwardly
non-use of force in any form whatsoever, mended for children as study aids as well as friendly gestures towards some socialist
including missiles and nuclear weapons, for the repertoire of clubs and circles en- states, promising them to open broad pros-
200 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
pects in the area of trade, economic, and and other fellow socialist countries, the Chi- The Central Committee of the CPSU at-
scientific-technical cooperation. The Chi- nese leadership is tactically using the PRC s tributes great importance to this work, since
nese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the opposition to both superpowers (USSR positive shifts in Chinese politics can be
effective political, economic, and other forms and USA), which allegedly came to terms facilitated in the near future only by strug-
of cooperation among socialist states, as to divide the world amongst them. gling relentlessly against the theory and prac-
well as by their interaction, which facilitates All this attests to the fact that the leaders tice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism
the strengthening of the international posi- of China have not changed their previous figures prominently, by further strengthen-
tions of socialism, and their [socialist states ] chauvinistic course in the international arena. ing the cohesion and unity of communist
ability to move forward with the resolution Domestically, the Chinese leadership, ranks, and by combining the efforts of the
of major issues in world politics. The Beijing having suppressed the enemies of their poli- Marxist-Leninist parties.
leadership aims to use any opportunity to cies during the so-called Cultural Revolu-
break the unity and cohesion of the socialist tion , is now trying to overcome the disor- CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
states, to weaken their existing social struc- der in economic and political life, brought COMMUNIST
ture. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases about by the actions of the very same ruling PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
its provocative statements on the Czecho- groups over the course of recent years. The
slovak question.5 Beijing has acted simi- well-known stabilization of socio-political 45-mz
larly with respect to the recent events in and economic life is occurring through all- sa/ka
Poland.6 encompassing militarization, leading to an
The communist and workers parties of atmosphere of a besieged fortress. The [Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li.
the fellow socialist countries, which firmly army is continuing to occupy key positions 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth
stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the country and serves as the main instru- Wishnick.]
and socialist internationalism, understand ment of power. As before a cult of Mao is
and respond appropriately to this tactical expanding, the regime of personal power is
1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant
from the International Research and Exchanges Board
step of Beijing s, which is directed at split- being strengthened in the constitution of the
(IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of
ting the socialist community and isolating PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed
State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the
the Soviet Union. in the country. This, of course, cannot but
Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible
The Moscow conference of communist have a pernicious influence on the social life
for the views expressed.
2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet
and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong of the entire Chinese people.
analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., com-
rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to In an oral statement made directly to
munist, forces within society, and the Maoist leader-
split them. Convinced by the futility of their Soviet officials about the desirability and
ship.
efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in possibility in the near future of the normal- 3. A.I. Elizavetin, Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou
Enlai v pekinskom aeroportu, with commentary by S.
individual countries into influential political ization of intergovernmental relations, the
Gonacharov and V. Usov, Problemy Dal nego Vostoka
parties, and to cobble them together into an Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideo-
5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119.
international anti-Leninist movement, the logical, and to a certain degree, the political
4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, TskhSD, F. 89, Op. 43.
Chinese leadership once again is counting struggle between the USSR and China, will
D. 53, L.1. 1-14, translated in Cold War International
History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81.
on its ability to either attract individual com- continue for a lengthy period of time.
5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
munist parties to its side, or at least to achieve As long as the Chinese leadership sticks
in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist move-
their refusal to publicly criticize the ideol- to ideological and political positions which
ment and Moscow s subsequent imposition of ortho-
ogy and policy of the CPC leadership. To are hostile to us, the stabilization and nor- dox normalization there.
6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities
this end, Beijing s propaganda and CPC malization of intergovernmental relations
to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk
officials are concentrating their main efforts between the Soviet Union and the PRC would
in December 1970, and a subsequent government shake-
on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of have to be achieved under conditions of
up.
foreign communists the foreign and domes- sharp ideological and political struggle.
tic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the In informing the party aktiv about the
USSR, and in the socialist community. At current status of Soviet-Chinese relations,
Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl freetocraft.keep.pl
the subject of the negotiations, on January viet revisionism. In China anti-Soviet bro- interest these states all the more loudly urge
15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet chures and posters are being published in the PRC to get actively involved in the
another step - it made a proposal to the huge numbers and widely distributed. For international community.
leadership of the PRC to conclude an agree- example, not long ago a series of brochures Recently the Chinese leadership has
ment between the USSR and the PRC on the with clearly anti-Soviet content was recom- been rather pointedly making outwardly
non-use of force in any form whatsoever, mended for children as study aids as well as friendly gestures towards some socialist
including missiles and nuclear weapons, for the repertoire of clubs and circles en- states, promising them to open broad pros-
200 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
pects in the area of trade, economic, and and other fellow socialist countries, the Chi- The Central Committee of the CPSU at-
scientific-technical cooperation. The Chi- nese leadership is tactically using the PRC s tributes great importance to this work, since
nese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the opposition to both superpowers (USSR positive shifts in Chinese politics can be
effective political, economic, and other forms and USA), which allegedly came to terms facilitated in the near future only by strug-
of cooperation among socialist states, as to divide the world amongst them. gling relentlessly against the theory and prac-
well as by their interaction, which facilitates All this attests to the fact that the leaders tice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism
the strengthening of the international posi- of China have not changed their previous figures prominently, by further strengthen-
tions of socialism, and their [socialist states ] chauvinistic course in the international arena. ing the cohesion and unity of communist
ability to move forward with the resolution Domestically, the Chinese leadership, ranks, and by combining the efforts of the
of major issues in world politics. The Beijing having suppressed the enemies of their poli- Marxist-Leninist parties.
leadership aims to use any opportunity to cies during the so-called Cultural Revolu-
break the unity and cohesion of the socialist tion , is now trying to overcome the disor- CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
states, to weaken their existing social struc- der in economic and political life, brought COMMUNIST
ture. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases about by the actions of the very same ruling PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
its provocative statements on the Czecho- groups over the course of recent years. The
slovak question.5 Beijing has acted simi- well-known stabilization of socio-political 45-mz
larly with respect to the recent events in and economic life is occurring through all- sa/ka
Poland.6 encompassing militarization, leading to an
The communist and workers parties of atmosphere of a besieged fortress. The [Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li.
the fellow socialist countries, which firmly army is continuing to occupy key positions 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth
stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the country and serves as the main instru- Wishnick.]
and socialist internationalism, understand ment of power. As before a cult of Mao is
and respond appropriately to this tactical expanding, the regime of personal power is
1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant
from the International Research and Exchanges Board
step of Beijing s, which is directed at split- being strengthened in the constitution of the
(IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of
ting the socialist community and isolating PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed
State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the
the Soviet Union. in the country. This, of course, cannot but
Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible
The Moscow conference of communist have a pernicious influence on the social life
for the views expressed.
2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet
and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong of the entire Chinese people.
analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., com-
rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to In an oral statement made directly to
munist, forces within society, and the Maoist leader-
split them. Convinced by the futility of their Soviet officials about the desirability and
ship.
efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in possibility in the near future of the normal- 3. A.I. Elizavetin, Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou
Enlai v pekinskom aeroportu, with commentary by S.
individual countries into influential political ization of intergovernmental relations, the
Gonacharov and V. Usov, Problemy Dal nego Vostoka
parties, and to cobble them together into an Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideo-
5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119.
international anti-Leninist movement, the logical, and to a certain degree, the political
4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, TskhSD, F. 89, Op. 43.
Chinese leadership once again is counting struggle between the USSR and China, will
D. 53, L.1. 1-14, translated in Cold War International
History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81.
on its ability to either attract individual com- continue for a lengthy period of time.
5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
munist parties to its side, or at least to achieve As long as the Chinese leadership sticks
in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist move-
their refusal to publicly criticize the ideol- to ideological and political positions which
ment and Moscow s subsequent imposition of ortho-
ogy and policy of the CPC leadership. To are hostile to us, the stabilization and nor- dox normalization there.
6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities
this end, Beijing s propaganda and CPC malization of intergovernmental relations
to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk
officials are concentrating their main efforts between the Soviet Union and the PRC would
in December 1970, and a subsequent government shake-
on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of have to be achieved under conditions of
up.
foreign communists the foreign and domes- sharp ideological and political struggle.
tic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the In informing the party aktiv about the
USSR, and in the socialist community. At current status of Soviet-Chinese relations,
Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]