[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
favour.
[*] Bluecher believed his march to be covered by Pahlen's Cossacks, but these had been withdrawn without
warning to him by the Grand Army Headquarters under Schwartzenberg.
It is the same with the battle of Liegnitz, 1760. Frederick the Great gained this fine victory through altering
during the night a position which he had just before taken up. Laudon was through this completely surprised,
and lost 70 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men. Although Frederick the Great had at this time adopted the
principle of moving backwards and forwards in order to make a battle impossible, or at least to disconcert the
enemy's plans, still the alteration of position on the night of the 14-15 was not made exactly with that
intention, but as the King himself says, because the position of the 14th did not please him. Here, therefore,
also chance was hard at work; without this happy conjunction of the attack and the change of position in the
night, and the difficult nature of the country, the result would not have been the same.
Also in the higher and highest province of Strategy there are some instances of surprises fruitful in results.
We shall only cite the brilliant marches of the Great Elector against the Swedes from Franconia to Pomerania
and from the Mark (Brandenburg) to the Pregel in 1757, and the celebrated passage of the Alps by
Buonaparte, 1800. In the latter case an Army gave up its whole theatre of war by a capitulation, and in 1757
another Army was very near giving up its theatre of war and itself as well. Lastly, as an instance of a War
wholly unexpected, we may bring forward the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great. Great and powerful
are here the results everywhere, but such events are not common in history if we do not confuse with them
cases in which a State, for want of activity and energy (Saxony 1756, and Russia, 1812), has not completed
its preparations in time.
Now there still remains an observation which concerns the essence of the thing. A surprise can only be
effected by that party which gives the law to the other; and he who is in the right gives the law. If we surprise
the adversary by a wrong measure, then instead of reaping good results, we may have to bear a sound blow in
return; in any case the adversary need not trouble himself much about our surprise, he has in our mistake the
means of turning off the evil. As the offensive includes in itself much more positive action than the defensive,
so the surprise is certainly more in its place with the assailant, but by no means invariably, as we shall
hereafter see. Mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive may therefore meet, and then that one will
have the advantage who has hit the nail on the head the best.
So should it be, but practical life does not keep to this line so exactly, and that for a very simple reason. The
moral effects which attend a surprise often convert the worst case into a good one for the side they favour,
and do not allow the other to make any regular determination. We have here in view more than anywhere else
not only the chief Commander, but each single one, because a surprise has the effect in particular of greatly
loosening unity, so that the individuality of each separate leader easily comes to light.
CHAPTER IX. THE SURPRISE 102
On War
Much depends here on the general relation in which the two parties stand to each other. If the one side
through a general moral superiority can intimidate and outdo the other, then he can make use of the surprise
with more success, and even reap good fruit where properly he should come to ruin.
CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM
STRATAGEM implies a concealed intention, and therefore is opposed to straightforward dealing, in the
same way as wit is the opposite of direct proof. It has therefore nothing in common with means of persuasion,
of self- interest, of force, but a great deal to do with deceit, because that likewise conceals its object. It is
itself a deceit as well when it is done, but still it differs from what is commonly called deceit, in this respect
that there is no direct breach of word. The deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person himself whom he is
deceiving to commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into ONE result, suddenly change the
nature of things in his eyes. We may therefore say, as nit is a sleight of hand with ideas and conceptions, so
stratagem is a sleight of hand with actions.
At first sight it appears as if Strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem; and that, with all
the real and apparent changes which the whole character of War has undergone since the time of the Greeks,
this term still points to its real nature.
If we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the blow, the battle itself, and look upon Strategy as the art of
using this means with skill, then besides the forces of the character, such as burning ambition which always
presses like a spring, a strong will which hardly bends there seems no subjective quality so suited to guide
and inspire strategic activity as stratagem. The general tendency to surprise, treated of in the foregoing
chapter, points to this conclusion, for there is a degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the
foundation of every attempt to surprise.
But however much we feel a desire to see the actors in War outdo each other in hidden activity, readiness,
and stratagem, still we must admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history, and have rarely
been able to work their way to the surface from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances.
The explanation of this is obvious, and it is almost identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter.
Strategy knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with the measures which relate to it. It has no
concern, like ordinary life, with transactions which consist merely of words--that is, in expressions,
declarations, But these, which are very inexpensive, are chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in
those he practises upon.
That which there is like it in War, plans and orders given merely as make-believers, false reports sent on
purpose to the enemy--is usually of so little effect in the strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular
cases which offer of themselves, therefore cannot be regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from
the leader.
But such measures as carrying out the arrangements for a battle, so far as to impose upon the enemy, require
a considerable expenditure of time and power; of course, the greater the impression to be made, the greater
the expenditure in these respects. And as this is usually not given for the purpose, very few demonstrations,
so-called, in Strategy, effect the object for which they are designed. In fact, it is dangerous to detach large
forces for any length of time merely for a trick, because there is always the risk of its being done in vain, and
then these forces are wanted at the decisive point.
The chief actor in War is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth, and therefore he has no desire to play
at tricks of agility. The bitter earnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct action that there is no room
CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM 103
On War
for that game. In a word, the pieces on the strategical chess-board want that mobility which is the element of
stratagem and subtility.
The conclusion which we draw, is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful
quality for a General than craftiness, although that also does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of
necessary qualities of the heart, which is only too often the case. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl freetocraft.keep.pl
favour.
[*] Bluecher believed his march to be covered by Pahlen's Cossacks, but these had been withdrawn without
warning to him by the Grand Army Headquarters under Schwartzenberg.
It is the same with the battle of Liegnitz, 1760. Frederick the Great gained this fine victory through altering
during the night a position which he had just before taken up. Laudon was through this completely surprised,
and lost 70 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men. Although Frederick the Great had at this time adopted the
principle of moving backwards and forwards in order to make a battle impossible, or at least to disconcert the
enemy's plans, still the alteration of position on the night of the 14-15 was not made exactly with that
intention, but as the King himself says, because the position of the 14th did not please him. Here, therefore,
also chance was hard at work; without this happy conjunction of the attack and the change of position in the
night, and the difficult nature of the country, the result would not have been the same.
Also in the higher and highest province of Strategy there are some instances of surprises fruitful in results.
We shall only cite the brilliant marches of the Great Elector against the Swedes from Franconia to Pomerania
and from the Mark (Brandenburg) to the Pregel in 1757, and the celebrated passage of the Alps by
Buonaparte, 1800. In the latter case an Army gave up its whole theatre of war by a capitulation, and in 1757
another Army was very near giving up its theatre of war and itself as well. Lastly, as an instance of a War
wholly unexpected, we may bring forward the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great. Great and powerful
are here the results everywhere, but such events are not common in history if we do not confuse with them
cases in which a State, for want of activity and energy (Saxony 1756, and Russia, 1812), has not completed
its preparations in time.
Now there still remains an observation which concerns the essence of the thing. A surprise can only be
effected by that party which gives the law to the other; and he who is in the right gives the law. If we surprise
the adversary by a wrong measure, then instead of reaping good results, we may have to bear a sound blow in
return; in any case the adversary need not trouble himself much about our surprise, he has in our mistake the
means of turning off the evil. As the offensive includes in itself much more positive action than the defensive,
so the surprise is certainly more in its place with the assailant, but by no means invariably, as we shall
hereafter see. Mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive may therefore meet, and then that one will
have the advantage who has hit the nail on the head the best.
So should it be, but practical life does not keep to this line so exactly, and that for a very simple reason. The
moral effects which attend a surprise often convert the worst case into a good one for the side they favour,
and do not allow the other to make any regular determination. We have here in view more than anywhere else
not only the chief Commander, but each single one, because a surprise has the effect in particular of greatly
loosening unity, so that the individuality of each separate leader easily comes to light.
CHAPTER IX. THE SURPRISE 102
On War
Much depends here on the general relation in which the two parties stand to each other. If the one side
through a general moral superiority can intimidate and outdo the other, then he can make use of the surprise
with more success, and even reap good fruit where properly he should come to ruin.
CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM
STRATAGEM implies a concealed intention, and therefore is opposed to straightforward dealing, in the
same way as wit is the opposite of direct proof. It has therefore nothing in common with means of persuasion,
of self- interest, of force, but a great deal to do with deceit, because that likewise conceals its object. It is
itself a deceit as well when it is done, but still it differs from what is commonly called deceit, in this respect
that there is no direct breach of word. The deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person himself whom he is
deceiving to commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into ONE result, suddenly change the
nature of things in his eyes. We may therefore say, as nit is a sleight of hand with ideas and conceptions, so
stratagem is a sleight of hand with actions.
At first sight it appears as if Strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem; and that, with all
the real and apparent changes which the whole character of War has undergone since the time of the Greeks,
this term still points to its real nature.
If we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the blow, the battle itself, and look upon Strategy as the art of
using this means with skill, then besides the forces of the character, such as burning ambition which always
presses like a spring, a strong will which hardly bends there seems no subjective quality so suited to guide
and inspire strategic activity as stratagem. The general tendency to surprise, treated of in the foregoing
chapter, points to this conclusion, for there is a degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the
foundation of every attempt to surprise.
But however much we feel a desire to see the actors in War outdo each other in hidden activity, readiness,
and stratagem, still we must admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history, and have rarely
been able to work their way to the surface from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances.
The explanation of this is obvious, and it is almost identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter.
Strategy knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with the measures which relate to it. It has no
concern, like ordinary life, with transactions which consist merely of words--that is, in expressions,
declarations, But these, which are very inexpensive, are chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in
those he practises upon.
That which there is like it in War, plans and orders given merely as make-believers, false reports sent on
purpose to the enemy--is usually of so little effect in the strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular
cases which offer of themselves, therefore cannot be regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from
the leader.
But such measures as carrying out the arrangements for a battle, so far as to impose upon the enemy, require
a considerable expenditure of time and power; of course, the greater the impression to be made, the greater
the expenditure in these respects. And as this is usually not given for the purpose, very few demonstrations,
so-called, in Strategy, effect the object for which they are designed. In fact, it is dangerous to detach large
forces for any length of time merely for a trick, because there is always the risk of its being done in vain, and
then these forces are wanted at the decisive point.
The chief actor in War is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth, and therefore he has no desire to play
at tricks of agility. The bitter earnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct action that there is no room
CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM 103
On War
for that game. In a word, the pieces on the strategical chess-board want that mobility which is the element of
stratagem and subtility.
The conclusion which we draw, is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful
quality for a General than craftiness, although that also does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of
necessary qualities of the heart, which is only too often the case. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]